TPRC 2024: The 52nd Research Conference on Communications, Information and Inter

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The issue of cross-border data flow is increasingly central given the crucial role data plays as the lifeblood of economic and social interactions (OECD, 2020). With the rise of digitalization and cross-border transactions, concerns about national and cyber security have become more pronounced (Pangestu, M. and H. Lee-Makiyama, 2019). To address these challenges, many advocate for cross-border data to adhere to privacy and security laws or standards, which can be more effectively enforced through data localization policies. These policies may entail requirements for certain types of data to be stored in local servers and mandates for local data processing (OECD, 2020).
The digital economy thrives on the currency of data, which fuels transactions for both big tech and homegrown tech companies alike. As digital transactions increasingly transcend borders, facilitated by cross-border data flows, they significantly shape the landscape of digital marketplaces. This process involves the monetization of data, enriching global marketplaces, and enabling personalized services, particularly benefiting emerging nations in their digital advancement.
Drawing from Varian's concept of network externalities, where the value of digital products amplifies with network size, it becomes evident that a few economically powerful countries dominate digital platforms and services, leaving others as users or secondary innovators. This power asymmetry, coupled with limited computational capabilities in developing nations, results in a lack of control over the data generated by their residents.
The challenge of cross-border data flows lies in balancing data mobility, personal privacy and security, and the process of data monetization. Drawing an analogy to the Mundell-Fleming Trilemma in Keynesian Macroeconomics, we argue that national regulatory regimes face similar trade-offs. Just as a country cannot simultaneously peg an exchange rate, maintain an independent monetary policy, and allow free cross-border financial flows, in the realm of data management, a nation cannot uphold personal data privacy and security while maintaining independent data monetization mechanisms and consenting to unchecked cross-border data flows. Choices in one domain necessarily impact the others, highlighting the complexity of policymaking in the digital age.
We have conducted a cross-country analysis based on a unique dataset to empirically validate our hypothesis, providing insights into the dynamics of cross-border data flows and their implications for digital marketplaces and national policy frameworks.

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Mergers in mobile markets are of keen interest to policy makers and scholars. Because carrier networks are subject to pronounced economies of scale and scope and given that communications regulators create substantial barriers to entry by limiting spectrum allocations for mobile services, wireless services generally exhibit relatively high levels of industrial concentration. Hence, antitrust authorities often struggle with the tradeoff between enhanced scale economies and enhanced market power. Between 2012 to 2016, for instance, four E.U. nations (Austria, Ireland, Germany, and Italy) consummated “4-to-3” mobile mergers while two such combinations were blocked (in Denmark and the U.K.). In the U.S., 4-to-3 transactions were blocked by regulators in 2011 and again in 2014, but a recent merger -- between the No. 3 (T-Mobile) and No. 4 (Sprint) carriers was approved in February 2020. This combination remains a subject of intense debate. We examine post-merger evidence of retail mobile subscription prices, network investment, service quality, market shares, and industry profits in the U.S. mobile communications industry. We conclude that the data are consistent with the thesis that the T-Mobile/Sprint merger produced consumer gains. This outcome is particularly interesting given that the government remedy imposed to mitigate potential anti-competitive merger effects, the creation of a new fourth network (DISH), has produced no plausible pro-competitive impact.

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The FCC Broadband Data Collection (BDC) program has had—and will continue to have—tremendous impact on directing policy interventions and funding towards the goal of achieving broadband equity, access, and deployment across the United States.
In this paper, we share our experience analyzing the data disseminated by the FCC as part of this program.
We focus on discussing the challenges and limitations that one may encounter when exploring the datasets made publicly available as part of this program.
Examples are the lack of direct, public data on the fabric layer; the retroactive removal of availability records from past data releases; and the purely file-based data serving model.
We provide recommendations to stakeholders on ways to overcome these challenges and cope with limitations.
These recommendations seek to introduce best practices for processing and analyzing the BDC data.
Where appropriate, we also bring suggestions to the FCC on approaches to eliminate data limitations and lower barriers to analysis.
These suggestions involve changes to how BDC data is published, served, updated, and summarized by the FCC.

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Space is getting crowded and policy tools for market design in satellite spectrum may be needed soon. Satellite radio spectrum does not fit neatly into a terrestrial auction model but that does not mean that market-oriented approaches are beyond reach. While satellite spectrum may incline toward command-and-control approaches, market design principles can help U.S. regulators keep pace with new deployments. This paper reviews the market participants, economic incentives, and policy options in several satellite and space proceedings at the FCC. I use a scoring method to apply market design thinking to analyze FCC proceedings on matters such as supplemental coverage from space, in-space assembly, manufacturing, and servicing, small satellites, satellite and earth stations, commercial space launch operations, earth stations in motion, and equivalent power flux density limits. The specific elements of each spectrum band are discussed with respect to economic factors relevant to innovation and competition among market participants.

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This paper explores a tension in spectrum policy that is unnecessarily limiting public access to the airwaves and the benefits of more intensive spectrum sharing and connectivity. Most spectrum licenses (including Federal spectrum assignments) confer exclusive or at least primary rights to transmit on designated frequency bands at specific locations, or over defined geographic areas, including inside factories, office buildings and other facilities owned and controlled by others. This traditional form of licensing precludes property owners from using the spectrum inside buildings under their own control even if the transmissions are contained and would not cause harmful interference to the primary licensee’s operations outdoors. While unlicensed operations have been authorized, until very recently the rules have not been crafted to distinguish between how access rights could vary based on indoor-only use.

The potential benefits of different rules for indoor-only use are becoming more evident. In 2020, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted an order authorizing low power, indoor-only (LPI) use of 1,200 megahertz on an unlicensed basis across the entire 6 GHz band (5925-7125 MHz), which was already in use by incumbent licensees that include more than 50,000 high-power fixed microwave links. LPI use of this spectrum indoors is limited to roughly one-fourth the standard power of Wi-Fi, yet is considered extremely useful since the vast majority of internet data (including at least 80% of mobile device data traffic) is transmitted indoors and over Wi-Fi. LPI highlights the potential to authorize indoor-only use in many other bands where users comply with power, device form factor, or other requirements that protect the primary licensees from harmful interference. 

This paper explores the policy and technical considerations related to expanding indoor-only authorizations to more bands. For example, controlling the spectrum inside a facility is more practical at higher frequencies where transmissions do not readily penetrate building materials or travel long distances. This concept is particularly relevant now, as the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and FCC collaborate to implement the National Spectrum Strategy, which is premised on studying alternative means to expand private sector use of underutilized Federal bands, particularly bands occupied by U.S. military systems. Five Federal bands that may be prime candidates for indoor-only authorizations—1,675 megahertz in total—are discussed in this report. LPI underlays also provide another way to expand on the “use it or share it” approach to spectrum sharing, but without the need for control by a geolocation database.

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This paper presents initial research to contribute to the discussion surrounding broadband access data. In this paper, an approach to quantifying community behaviors across critical demographics for broadband mapping is explored and a research roadmap presented. Ultimately, the goal of this research is to offer a recommendation for improvement of the U.S. federal broadband map data process to establish the best holistic representation of broadband access for public policy research and decision making. The paper explores two initial research questions. First, how have community behavior and requirements data been collected and considered in U.S. broadband development initiatives, subsidies, and policies? Second, how have community behaviors been quantified in previous policy research? Finally, this paper presents a research roadmap on how to identify and apply community behavior data to the National Broadband Map for effective policy decisions.

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While there has been an explosive growth in investment and innovation in satellite technology throughout the last decade, earth stations, the terminals that establish terrestrial communication with satellites, have gone largely unnoticed despite their critical role.

Commercial earth stations are broadly divided between gateways and user terminals. Gateways, also known as teleports, are typically larger, stationary antennas connected to fiber, and are licensed on an individual basis. User terminals are relatively smaller antennas, which can be fixed or mobile, and are often granted on a blanket license basis. As of early March 2024, there were 9,665 current and 1,465 pending applications. C-band downlink with 28.9% and Ku-band uplink with 16.1% accounted for the majority of spectrum requests. SpaceX was the only filer to have any requests for the E-band, demonstrating that most of the extremely high frequencies still remain impractical for most applicants. California had the highest number of ground station sites with 354 followed by Georgia with 308, and Alaska with 261. When considering the natural hazard risk of 4,963 unique, fixed sites within the continental U.S., 23.1% are located in a place that faces an average high risk across various natural hazards. This risk rises dramatically in certain states with 73.3% of California and 71.5% of Florida ground stations facing an average high natural hazard risk. There were 75,845 conditions placed on granted ground station filings with the majority being verbatim restatements of part 25 regulations, obfuscating which conditions go beyond existing regulations. Lastly, no widely used condition was linked to a dramatically longer time delay for applicants with the average delay between filing and granting being a median of 118 days (~17 weeks). Overall, this research provides a first of its kind overview of U.S. ground station filings at a time of substantial shifts in the satellite industry.

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Over recent decades, US spectrum policy has transitioned from a case-by-case administrative model to a Coasian one, where market mechanisms allocate exclusive yet flexible spectrum rights. This paper suggests that observing both formal and informal spectrum-management practices calls for a policy framework enabling comparative analysis across various governance structures, from exclusive access to spectrum commons. We propose an alternative framework, drawing on Elinor Ostrom's research on polycentric systems, to evaluate spectrum-sharing solutions, particularly unlicensed spectrum. Our analysis suggests that "unassigned" spectrum bands, like communal ownership or private commons within a flexible-licensing regime, can balance the trade-offs of exclusive and nonexclusive access.

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Since the United States' attempt to regulate TikTok in 2020 due to national security concerns, 32 countries have implemented various regulatory measures against the platform for different reasons. This study uses global TikTok regulations as a case study to investigate the types of social media threats perceived by nations and their corresponding regulatory responses. Employing thematic analysis, we examine the relationship between threat perceptions regarding TikTok and regulatory responses across different countries. Grounded in the dual attributes of content and data within social media, along with considerations of threats at both national and individual levels, we formulate a typology of national threats emanating from social media. The findings reveal that (i) countries perceiving threats to TikTok from national security-data concerns are more inclined to implement measures isolating it from critical devices, (ii) countries perceiving threats related to individual well-being-data are more prone to adopting privacy regulations, and (iii) countries perceiving threats linked to national security-content and individual well-being-content are more inclined to enforce complete bans or content regulations. These decisions are influenced by factors including domestic stability, religious convictions, and democratization.

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The Digital Markets Act (DMA) is a cornerstone of European digital platform regulation. Gatekeepers are required to enable interoperability of their number-independent interpersonal communications services (NI-ICS), which are designated as core platform services (CPS) like e.g. messaging ser-vice WhatsApp. To this end the DMA defines a three-stage implementation of interoperability, start-ing with simple bilateral text communication with further features to follow over a period of four years (DMA, Art. 7(2)).
Using a consumer survey in Germany with 2,826 respondents, this study examines the potential effect of interoperability on consumer preferences for using specific NI-ICS. As NI-ICS are subject to network effects, demand tends to gravitate towards services with a larger user base, which has re-sulted in a highly concentrated market. Horizontal interoperability could counteract such tendencies towards concentration. However, this desired effect is highly dependent on the willingness of con-sumers to use NI-ICS in an interoperable manner, and which NI-ICS they choose to use as a result of interoperability.
There are two main findings from our consumer survey:
First, we find that almost all NI-ICS users in Germany tend to use NI-ICS (97%), which are designat-ed as CPS. WhatsApp alone is currently used by around 93% of NI-ICS users and is typically ac-cessed on a daily basis. In contrast, only 50% of NI-ICS users use an alternative (non-gatekeeper) service. Overall, alternative services are used less frequently and tend to play a subordinate role in the interpersonal communication of German users.
Second, very few NI-ICS users are opposed to interoperability, 64% consider it useful, and at each stage of implementation more than half of respondents indicate that they would use interoperability - at least in some cases – to communicate with specific contacts, via certain functions or via certain services. However, the majority of NI-ICS users that intend to adopt interoperability expect to contin-ue to use gatekeeper services to the same extent as they do now. In addition, the proportion of users who intend to use gatekeeper services to a greater extent than before the introduction of interopera-bility slightly outweighs the proportion of users who intend to use these services less. With regard to the use of alternative NI-ICS, the proportion of users who say they will use alternative NI-ICS less than before the introduction of interoperability is about twice as high as the proportion of users who intend to use these services more.
Therefore, interoperability as mandated by the DMA could lead to a reduction in the use of alternative NI-ICS by those NI-ICS users who choose to enable interoperability. It may even increase the incen-tive to use gatekeeper services, thereby contributing to the strengthening of gatekeeper ecosys-tems. Our results therefore call into question the incentive for alternative NI-ICS providers to de-mand interoperability from gatekeepers in the first place. Overall, our analysis suggests that the effect of the horizontal interoperability obligation for NI-ICS in the DMA may be contrary to the in-tended effect, or at least will not mitigate the concentration tendencies in the market for NI-ICS.

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The South Korea telecom services market reports annual revenues of $32 billion. The country is noted for market-based network usage fees in which content providers (both domestic and foreign) negotiate access to broadband networks. The magnitude and volume of such fees are not public, but news reports suggest they amount to less than 1 percent of the total market revenue. This paper investigates the size and volume of the network usage fee regime and impacts on related broadband and content markets. 

As usage fees have been place for some years in Korea, this paper reviews the development of the Korean broadband and content markets and whether changes can be observed after the introduction of usage fees to the industry structure, revenue, market size, concentration, penetration, technological development, and other variables. International comparisons are offered to see whether there are statistically significant differences in countries without formal usage fee regimes. 

Results are expected to be correlative, not causative. Theoretical modeling is explored in parallel to explore whether and how results could change under different circumstances.

A conceptual framework suggests expected relationship between variables and defines objectives for the research process. In this respect, the authors hypothesize that network usage fees have a neutral effect on the market, or at best positive. Alternative scenarios are explored, for example the refusal to supply by content providers and the lack of reinvestment of fees into the network. 

The paper explores other reasons why the Korean regime may be an appropriate model or not, for example, the discrete number of broadband providers, the presence of an authority to meter and publicize traffic levels, the ease of measurement of international traffic because of limited entry points to the country, policy orientation towards technological innovation, and so on. 

The paper is relevant for at least 4 themes promoted at TPRC52 including
• Broadband Deployment, Access and the Digital Divide, Criticality of Infrastructure
• Social Dimensions to Communications and Internet Policy
• Policies Governing the Digital Economy
• Geopolitics, Digital Sovereignty, and Tech Regulation.
Moreover, it offers new, original, and valuable data and analysis for policy scholars including a bibliography of Korean sources of information on usage fees translated and summarized for an English-speaking audience, a formal presentation of Korean content market development over the last decade and reference to international proceedings on the similar topic in other countries as appropriate. 

The paper offers a timely review of the small but emerging literature on the topic of network usage fees and interconnection and the significant literature in Korean on the nation’s broadband policy, which is not necessarily accessed by English language scholars. 
The work is significant because many nations consider whether and how to engage in such regimes and whether market-based or regulated approaches are superior. Proceedings have been undertaken or underway in USA, European Union, Brazil, among other regions.

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What will NASA’s future communications demand and expenditure look like? In this paper we consider this question, as NASA moves towards commercial procurement for Direct-To-Earth and Space Relay communication services. As part of this task, we undertake a literature review which considers the potential for internal market-based management accounting options for optimizing budgetary and network resources. Then we develop a new Techno-Economic Assessment (TEA) model capable of evaluating the incremental cost over time to NASA of utilizing commercial communication services, for different mission and market scenarios. Three key conclusions are found. Firstly, NASA should explore activity-based cost accounting for managing internal communication resources, to ensure behavioral incentives are aligned with underlying delivery costs. Secondly, current and future NASA demand is a viable option from commercial services, with the potential to reduce cost through the use of non-exclusive networks and the sharing of fixed costs. Finally, in terms of market procurement, NASA should seek to award service contracts to 3-4 providers, as this level optimizes economies of scale benefits, while mitigating possible market collusion. These recommendations will enable NASA to successfully achieve its scientific mission over the next decade, while managing limited financial and networking resources.

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The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) and its counterparts globally keep a keen eye on spectrum concentration. This is because concentration in input markets is conjectured to have the effect of driving anticompetitive behavior in the relevant output markets. Spectrum is a necessity for the provision of mobile wireless services, and by accumulating spectrum holdings mobile carriers could wield their spectrum portfolios to obtain market advantages over competitors. For example, simply preventing spectrum to fall in the hands of your competitors increases deployment costs for them going forward, making them less competitive and in turn allowing the carrier that has accumulated the spectrum to compete less fiercely for customers. More spectrum, however, lowers your own production costs. In this paper, we develop theory describing the pro and anti-competitive incentives of spectrum accumulation and evaluate to what extent these theoretical findings can be empirically supported in the US market for mobile services. Generally, it should be expected that more concentrated markets exhibit lower product quality than less concentrated markets. To empirically test the theory, we will examine a combination of FCC Measuring Broadband America data and Universal Licensing System data to detect any econometrically significant relationships between mobile service quality and spectrum concentration.

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A widening set of applications may soon be offered by broadband providers and edge providers, including home security, smart home, video conferencing, gaming, IoT device connectivity, autonomous vehicle connectivity, industrial control, and smart factory connectivity.

Multiple policy and regulatory issues surround these specialized services. Can they be offered over the Internet or do they require special treatment? When offered by broadband providers, are these offerings evading Open Internet rules regarding application-specific discrimination or prioritization? Can third-party application providers compete on a level playing field with ISPs offering such specialized services? What is the regulatory classification of the service and/or the underlying connectivity? Are existing regulatory schemes sufficient? If not, what rules should apply?

We consider two policy objectives. First, the development of specialized services should be encouraged, or at least not impeded, by the regulatory landscape. Second, to the extent there is a tradeoff between specialized services and broadband Internet access service, the regulatory landscape should strike a balance that is in the public interest.
Under the 2015 Open Internet Order, specialized services do not reach large parts of the Internet, are not a generic platform, and/or use isolated capacity. We propose an alternative approach, based on the Computer II framework, to classify the connectivity underlying specialized services as a telecommunications service, and to require this connectivity to be offered on a nondiscriminatory basis.

Under our proposed Computer II framework, a broadband provider could offer prioritized applications such as video conferencing and gaming, providing that it offers the same prioritization to end users on a nondiscriminatory basis. A broadband provider could also offer applications bundled with connectivity, such as home security, smart home, telemetry, automobile services, and industrial applications, providing that it offers the underlying connectivity to edge providers on a nondiscriminatory basis.

For prioritized applications, end users would be offered broadband plans that include the ability to prioritize applications of their choice. An end user could prioritize an application offered by a broadband provider and/or one offered by a third-party application provider. For bundled applications, end users could choose to obtain an application such as home security that runs over their broadband service or to obtain a bundle that includes both the application and the required underlying connectivity.

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The rapid evolution of today’s technology landscape, driven by algorithm-driven systems (ADS), profoundly impacts everyday life and major societal functions. ADS, often perceived as mysterious or magical, are sophisticated computational methods that enable automated decision-making in various domains such as finance, employment, and social media content delivery. Despite their pervasive influence, understanding of these systems remains limited among the general public, posing risks to informed citizenship and democratic participation. This paper addresses the critical need for Algorithmic Literacy, a concept that extends beyond existing frameworks of media and digital literacy to encompass a basic proficiency in understanding how ADS function and influence personal and societal outcomes. Our research identifies a significant gap in Algorithmic Literacy among social media users, exacerbated by the increasing complexity and opacity of AI technologies. We propose a preliminary definition of Algorithmic Literacy and argue for its necessity in contemporary society. The paper outlines initial measures for fostering Algorithmic Literacy and sets a future research agenda to support these efforts. Our goal is to initiate a critical discourse on Algorithmic Literacy, calling on citizens, educators, policymakers, media professionals, and technologists to prioritize this issue to ensure informed and active participation in an increasingly algorithm-driven world.

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Space, "the final frontier," has become an attractive, but increasingly risky market for both public and private investments.  Gold rush enthusiasm anticipates solutions to the Digital Divide via small low earth orbiting satellites, extraction of valuable minerals from asteroids, a vibrant space launch and tourism industry, and expanding earth observation opportunities.  Such entrepreneurial boldness juxtaposes with a severe lag in government oversight, consumer safeguards, and essential operational guardrails. The ambitious plans of Elon Musk and other space entrepreneurs could fail, despite recent market success, as SpaceX’s plans for 148 rocket launches in 2024.


Without substantial refinement of global space treaties and effective national regulation, expanding and imprudent use of space resources could trigger "the tragedy of the commons," rendering the most valuable regions of space unusable. Satellites could collide, or strike orbiting debris at extremely high speeds. Accidental collisions are more likely in a crowded orbital region, such as 200-1200 miles above earth where low earth orbiting satellites operate.


A much more costly calamity can occur when a valuable, fully operational satellite collides with space debris, such as a deactivated satellite and launch stage, or when it becomes a target in a test of anti-satellite (“ASAT”) technology. The likelihood of a space object collisions increases substantially when space faring nations and private ventures do not nudge no longer useful objects upward, farther into deep space, or on a downward trajectory toward earth that would guarantee complete vaporization. The testing and future use of ASAT technology risks “weaponizing” space, despite treaty-level commitments to use it solely for peaceful purposes, benefitting everyone.


This paper explains how national governments have generated or tolerated the proliferation of space debris to potentially dangerous levels of space debris without penalty. The paper provides case study analysis of instances where space debris was generated by space object collisions and tests of anti-satellite technology. It also explains how intergovernmental agreements, such as the five space treaties administered by the United Nations, and the space/spectrum management agreements of the International Telecommunication Union, have not required space debris mitigation, nor sanctioned operators responsible for generating more space debris.



The failure to address and resolve proliferating space debris from ASATs and abandoned space objects will increase the potential for calamities that render space access too risky. The paper identifies how intergovernmental agreements can mandate space debris mitigation, impose sanctions for noncompliance, and create financial incentives for recycling and removing existing debris.

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Device affordability is one of the key barriers to Internet access and use in most low-and-middle income countries. Reducing and/or eliminating taxes on devices has emerged as a major way to make devices more affordable. However, the empirical evidence on the impact of reducing and/or eliminating tax on device access remains limited. To help fill this gap, this study estimates the impact of Colombia’s 2017 VAT exemption on smartphone penetration rates. Using the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) applied to country-level panel data from 2009 to 2021, our study finds that smartphone penetration in Colombia reached 66.8 percent in 2021. This represents an increase of 7.6 percentage points over the 59.2 percent level of its synthetic counterpart, equivalent to a 12.8 percent relative increase. These results were validated through placebo tests and other robustness checks. These findings confirm that reducing and/or eliminating taxes on smartphones improves smartphone penetration and contributes towards bridging the digital divide. The work can be extended by exploring VAT exemptions in other countries and reductions on other forms of taxes.

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The scarcity of available spectrum bands has prompted the exploration and analysis of strategies for sharing spectrum with existing users. The US is considering several bands as part of its National Spectrum Strategy. In this paper, we consider sharing spectrum with the Broadcast Auxiliary Service (BAS) in the 6, 7 and 12 GHz bands. We develop simple models to examine the impact of interference in these bands to BAS-like operations. Our findings contribute to understanding the feasibility of various spectrum sharing regimes, such as, property rights easement, spectrum commons and spectrum anarchy. The key technical result of this study is that while new spectrum uses in the 6, 7, and 12 GHz bands can cause significant interference, this can be managed effectively through mitigation strategies such as dynamic exclusion zones, lower EIRP levels for indoor use, and advanced detection methods.

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Robert Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox (1978) has been a justification for a lack of antitrust enforcement for over four decades. This paper addresses how the Bork criteria can be used today, if applied correctly, to supplement the approach to antitrust. His test asks if consumers are harmed by the pricing practices of the firm in the market in which they purchase the good or service. Even if these firms are monopolies or oligopolies in their fields with huge economic rents, if they pass this test, no action is taken against them. “Bigness is not bad.” This narrow view, inter alia, ignores two- and multisided markets (MSM) where the appearance of “no harm” is addressed to only one side of the market. The correct view is to examine all the markets impacting potential harm to consumers. It illustrates the harm which is “free” to the users, but advertisers pay dearly for the ability to micro-focus on potential consumers of their products. Facebook and Google are used as examples. This advertising cost is added to the sales price of the product, resulting in consumers being harmed by the embedded advertising costs in the products or services purchased. We argue here, using Bork’s own criterion – except to expand it to the other side of the market – that much needed antitrust action has been ignored by this narrow criterion. This analysis indicates that antitrust action is long overdue after considering two-sided markets. In addition, we argue that his “consumers’ welfare” criterion is misleading and liable to deceive, thus the deception. The Biden administration has taken a more aggressive approach to antitrust and consumer protection than previous administrations. Three antitrust suits have been filed against Alphabet (Google) and two against Meta (Facebook) in the United States. The European Community, which has been more aggressive in its pursuit of Big Tech – Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, Meta (Facebook), Microsoft, etc., is considering additional rules and regulation of the sector. This paper addresses how the Bork criteria can be used today, if applied correctly, to supplement the neo-Brandeisian approach. We address the Bork Paradox in its own terms by examining the second side of the market which harms consumers indirectly by increasing the price of the products and services they purchase. Using the corrected Bork metric – both sides of the market and no producer’s surplus – the estimated loss of consumers’ welfare was $101.9 and $36.8 billion respectively from Alphabet (Google) and Meta (Facebook), respectively in 2023. The cumulative loss from 2013 to 2023 is over $888 billion

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This study examines the posited relationship between diversity and the supply of debiased AI, using a cross-sectional survey sample of AI professionals working in Silicon Valley. The results of preliminary analyses show that increased diversity, when indicated by value diversity as opposed to demographic diversity, had a significant effect on decreased AI bias. Further, the analysis found that there was no significant difference in manufactured AI bias or the effort to debias AI attributable to the socio-demographic diversity alone, as self-reported by AI industry insiders. The study concludes with a call for much closer attention 1) to diversity in its conceptual and regulatory operationalization and 2) to conditional institutional variables in translating diversity into discernible effects. The author of this study emphasizes a preliminary nature of the findings, with suggestions for the potential areas of improvement in the future AI debate.

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Advancements in most information communication technologies are commonly assessed based on their potential impacts on global power dynamics. Notably, the emergence of mega satellite constellations is perceived as a strategic investment, serving dual purposes: strengthening a nation's presence in outer space and enhancing its influence and control over the critical infrastructure that supports the global Internet. The escalating global tensions related to cybersecurity and the subsequent initiatives aimed at asserting cyber sovereignty drive the geopolitical competition among spacefaring major powers to expand their space-based Internet infrastructure. However, this endeavor comes at a cost, as the proliferation of satellite constellations expands the environmental impact of Internet connectivity into outer space. It is crucial that the drive to assert dominance in Earth's orbits, already heavily congested, is tempered with an awareness of the need to preserve a sustainable orbital environment for the benefit of future generations. This research analyses whether major spacefaring nations' recent law and policy initiatives prioritise the geopolitics of Internet and national security goals rather than environmentally responsible and sustainable governance frameworks for outer space, particularly regarding the emerging mega-satellite constellations.

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Current economic and political factors, aligned to keep a geopolitical balance of power between the countries that produce telecom equipment – companies such as Ericsson, Nokia, Samsung, Mavenir, NEC and Fujitsu vs. Huawei and ZTE – are providing a challenging battle when it comes to emergent markets in developing countries. Worldwide there are wide arguments that Huawei and ZTE deliver better and cheaper equipment with usually lower rates of borrowing from the Chinese financial service industry. Furthermore, it is implied that other vendors are more expensive and if chosen the cost will hinder the expansion of infrastructure in rural areas.

This paper will present the result of the evaluation of data sourced from both regulators and industry in emerging markets on the choices made by telecom infrastructure providers, when to select or decline a vendor to be a trusted partner. For this purpose, we have reviewed both policy and industry actions in Latin America and the European Economic Area as both are representative of the challenges telecom infrastructure investment confront. Source documents revised in English, Spanish and Portuguese include reports and evaluations for partners section in those two regions.

Our analysis calls for a more careful appreciation of such statements. Instead of focusing just on the pricing of active equipment alone which makes a share of total cost of a radio access site or an end-to-end network, a more comprehensive approach to analysis is to compare the actual difference in costs, taking into consideration all factors, including the coverage, energy efficiency and quality network operations can provide. We also gathered evidence that the saving on buying infrastructure by the operator tends to improve their free cash flow that is not used to buy more equipment or improve coverage, but to increase the share price and dividends to shareholders.

The evidence collected points to some observations that require careful evaluation, take the case for example the comparison of CAPEX vs Sale and indicator of potential scale of impact on end-user prices. The more comprehensive approach in this paper takes into account what does it cost to build infrastructure, how much of that money goes into RAN equipment and how much goes to steel towers, power, and blue collared workers and other costs that are independent of the vendor chosen. There is also a need of determining if it is really the case that the operators in e.g. Latin America or Africa who do not use Chinese equipment have poorer network / coverage, and if it is the case that the operators using Chinese equipment have better networks.

The European Union has elaborated in the last few years policies and restrictions towards privacy and security breaches by Chinese telecom equipment and has successfully enforced on telecom operators’ requirements to include comprehensive estimates (E.g. Costa Rica).

Decision making when it comes to vendors require to make in-depth questions such as: What are the other hidden costs associated with choosing a non-trusted vendor like Huawei or ZTE? The distribution of such costs between the society and private telecom operators of infrastructure is of importance, to understand private companies’ incentives and risk incentives. Furthermore, the issue of trust is very relevant when it comes to choosing partners and short and medium term “savings” in infrastructure development in telecoms are not easy or cheap to rectify once the network is deployed to comply with regulation from countries or regions – such as the European Economic Area - that have objections to networks managed by non-trusted vendors. Hence the so-called benefits can end up taking a significant toll in terms of costs and loans to comply with those requirements.

It is our belief that our main contribution is to provide a framework where all these factors are taken into consideration both regulators and network operators will carefully consider present and future choices of vendors worldwide. Since the goal is to create, deploy and maintain networks that are cost viable, economically profitable, and trusted to provide the privacy and security citizens of democratic countries are entitled to, as these will be the foundation of the evolving digital economy in emerging markets .

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Future G networks will require more dynamic, agile support for the management of radio frequency spectrum on a fine-grained basis. The radio access network (RAN) technologies necessary to enable Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) have progressed significantly over the past 20 years, but the challenges of realizing the potential for DSA requires the co-evolution of the technologies, business models/market structures, and regulatory policy for wireless networks. This paper discusses a bottom-up, multi-disciplinary approach to DSA. In particular, we focus on the use of standards-based Spectrum Consumption Models (SCMs), and review on-going research to incorporate SCMs in an automated management framework based on incentive-compatible, technically-sound spectrum access contracts, or Spectrum Access Agreements (SAAs). This work is being undertaken as part of the NSF National Radio Dynamic Zone (NRDZ) research initiative and this paper provides an introduction to the core concepts of the SCM/SAA framework, project goals, and preliminary insights into how the SCM/SAA can help improve spectrum management and advance R&D efforts to enable the transition to a shared spectrum future. The SCM/SAA research represents a bottom-up effort to develop the techno-economic tools to facilitate market-based experimentation and development of spectrum sharing markets, business models, and applications to complement and render more economically viable and relevant emerging DSA technologies and top-down regulatory reforms aimed at lowering spectrum sharing barriers.

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The paper covers a 40 year history of media ownership in the United States

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This paper is a comparative analysis of how two leading developing nations, China and India, are proposing to regulate artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Despite similarity in circumstances as large developing economies aiming to upgrade their technology sectors and create jobs, the two countries have taken significantly different approaches to AI regulation. We discuss the reasons why, based on review of agency reports and documents in the two countries.

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Despite significant efforts to enhance digital connectivity in Canada's Far North, connectivity issues persist, particularly in small rural/remote communities. This paper provides a baseline study exploring the early-stage impact of Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite technology, Starlink, in addressing these connectivity issues. Historically, these communities have relied on costly and limited internet services, often depending on older DSL and satellite technologies. Although improvements like fibre backbone infrastructure have been made, many regions still struggle with connectivity. The recent emergence of LEO satellites presents a potential breakthrough due to their lower latency, higher bandwidth, and potentially reduced costs when compared to traditional geostationary satellites. However, available data on user experiences with LEO satellite services remains limited.

This paper reports preliminary findings from a baseline study conducted in the Northwest Territories (NWT) of Canada, where Starlink Internet services have recently become available. This research, part of a larger multi-year project funded by Indigenous Services Canada, presents findings from household surveys examining the perceived impacts of LEO connectivity on daily life in among end users living in two remote NWT communities: Aklavik and Lutselk’e. Results indicate that Starlink users experience better internet speed, reliability, and cost-effectiveness compared to non-users, with notable improvements in digital access and engagement in online activities. However, concerns remain about the affordability and reliability of these new services, particularly given high initial costs, lack of local technical support and potential impacts on economic development opportunities from Indigenous-led connectivity solutions.

The study highlights the potential of LEO satellites to bridge the digital divide in underserved regions, but also points to limitations and challenges that need addressing to maximize their benefits. Future research will continue to track user experiences and the broader impact of LEO technology on connectivity in remote Indigenous communities.

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I measure across- and within-household inequalities in the adoption of digital technologies. I leverage nationally representative household surveys in 98 low- and middle-income countries to build a new dataset covering 2,030,308 households surveyed between 2015-2023 – a dataset representative of 4.2 billion of the world’s population. Where feasible, I link household-level surveys with within-household women’s surveys. I then use this dataset to provide harmonised survey-based estimates of mobile phone ownership and use (for financial transactions), computer ownership and use, internet access at the household, and women’s use. I document three patterns: 1) Women’s phone ownership lags household ownership across the wealth distribution, with particularly stark gaps in South Asia. 2) Even when women own phones, their reported use of the internet (ever) or for financial transactions is lower and heterogeneous across low- and middle-income countries. 3) While mobile phones have wide proliferation, computers and internet access are often much poorer.

Professor Goodman specializes in information policy law. Her research interests include smart cities, algorithmic governance, freedom of expression, platform policies, communications architectures, media and advertising law, and transparency policy. She is Co-Director and co-founder of the Rutgers Institute for Information Policy & Law (RIIPL).
Professor Goodman recently completed service as Senior Advisor for Algorithmic Justice at NTIA, U.S. Department of Commerce. She has served as a Senior Fellow at the Digital Innovation & Democracy Institute at the German Marshall Fund and has received grants from the Knight, Ford, and Geraldine R. Dodge Foundation for various projects involving new models of platform regulation and transparency, digital public media and democracy, and algorithmic system justice. She has also advised a number of cities on responsible tech deployment, served as Distinguished Visiting Scholar at the FCC, and held visiting positions at Yale Law School, the University of Pennsylvania's Carey Law School, Annenberg School of Communication, and the Wharton School, as well as the London School of Economics. 
Prior to joining the Rutgers faculty in 2003, Professor Goodman was a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Covington & Burling LLP and served as Of Counsel with the firm until 2009. Professor Goodman clerked for Judge Norma L. Shapiro on the U.S. Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, after graduating from Harvard Law School and Harvard College. She has three children. She blogs at riipl.rutgers.edu and at medium.com, and has written for the The Guardian, Tech Policy Press, Democracy, and Slate.

This panel compares and contrasts how regulatory agencies and approaches are emerging in different regions to address digital challenges and opportunities. The audience will learn whether and how nations decide to address problems with current resources, reform existing regulatory agencies, create new ones, or leave the problems alone. The panelists are leading authors and regulators who will describe the dynamic landscape of digital technologies, their impact on various sectors, and the role of a digital regulatory agencies for these areas. They will discuss the challenges that digital regulatory agencies face--promoting innovation and consumer protection, managing data privacy and security, and balancing free speech and misinformation. The panel will cover a wide range of topics related to a government agency’s role and responsibilities in overseeing the digital landscape. Speakers present international perspectives on how digital regulatory agencies are emerging in US, EU, Asia, Latin America and Africa.

The Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) Program in the U.S. has directed $42.45 billion in funding to accelerate the development and deployment of broadband infrastructure that meets specific service requirements such as minimum service speeds of 100 Mbps in the downstream and 20 Mbps in the upstream, peak hour latency below 100 ms, and network reliability of no more than 48 hours of outage time over any 365-day period. An often-overlooked element to the development of these requirements are the substantial policy implications they carry for determining preferred local access network technology options, preferred broadband service operators based upon their legacy technology positions, and the overall degree to which the nation’s households are unserved and underserved in terms of broadband access. Moreover, the performance requirements can influence, the design and evolution of the Internet architecture itself by influencing the selection or implementation of protocols and measurement metrics used by broadband network operators. To date in the U.S., Broadband Internet Access Service (BIAS) performance requirements have been developed in a number of different policy efforts such as the FCC’s annual Section 706 inquiries since the 1996 Telecom Act, part of the FCC’s universal service broadband funding programs since the National Broadband Plan (beginning with CAF Phase I and II, ACAM, and then RDOF), or adopted for broadband funding programs passed by Congress (such as Treasury’s Capital Project Fund and now the NTIA’s BEAD program).
This panel will investigate various policy concerns that arise from the lack of a consistent policy framework for defining BIAS performance requirements by addressing the following questions:

1. Prior Efforts to Characterize Performance-Related Policy Concerns.
2. How has Internet Performance Changed Over Time?
3. Increasing Importance of Latency in Internet Performance using Internet Engineering Task Force’s (IETF) Low Latency Low Loss Scalable Throughput (L4S) open standards.
4. Anticipated New Requirements from Emerging Internet Applications.
5. Putting It All Together: How Should Broadband Funding Be Linked to Internet Performance Requirements?

This panel will discuss three key policy issues. Firstly, what can be learned from past government policy decisions to purchase commercial communications services? Secondly, what should NASA’s role be in different commercial models, and what might the advantages or disadvantages of various approaches be? Finally, how should NASA optimize the benefits of having a competitive market place, versus the economies of scale benefits of bulk purchasing?
 

If previous timeframes are to be followed, the next generation cellular system, 6G, can expect to roll out around 2030 (i.e., just 6 years from today). Consequently, discussions in the 3GPP and ITU on the development of 6G standards will begin in 2024. Thus, it is timely and relevant to bring together experts who are considering the technical, economic, policy, and regulation that surround the expectations of this emerging standard. In this light, multiple questions need to be addressed to start defining the new standard from multiple perspectives. These questions include but are not limited to the following: Should 6G be 10x faster than 5G? Should it be a lower cost than other standards (e.g., 5G) to reduce the digital divide? Should it focus on programmability and customization? How should spectrum sharing be incorporated into this new standard? The panel will address these and other topics that are likely to emerge over the next several months.

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The boom in AI governance initiatives rests on deeply flawed understandings of digital technology and its underlying political economy. This paper rejects prevailing conceptualizations of the AI governance problem and goes so far as to reject the label “AI” as a meaningful and useful name for the object of governance. What we now call “AI” is really a globally integrated digital ecosystem composed of computing devices, digital networks, digitized data, and software programs. The article’s theme is that what we now call “artificial intelligence” is not a new technology that creates its own distinctive governance problems, but outgrowths of computing and the ecosystem of technical standards, data, devices and networks that have grown up around it. From a public policy standpoint, “AI” is an unscientific, over-simplified label for evolving applications of computing. The applications we call AI are so numerous, so diverse, and so indistinguishable from computing as to render the concept of “AI governance” meaningless.

The claim that AI doesn’t exist may seem tendentious and exaggerated, but it has the virtue of clearing the deck for a more accurate understanding of the governance implications of the digital transformation. Once we stop obsessing about “AI” and focus attention on the broader digital ecosystem, the governance problems we face are clarified. “Governing” the production and use of intelligent applications requires systemic awareness of nearly all manifestations of computing. In other words, what most people mean by “AI governance” presumes comprehensive data governance, controls on the production and distribution of semiconductors and other devices, effective Internet governance, regulation of cloud providers/platforms, and regulation of the production and distribution of software and software architectures. Further, the policy and governance problems allegedly caused by “AI” predate LLMs and chatbots and have cropped up repeatedly during the longer-term history of computing and the Internet. “AI governance” is just digital governance.

Shifting our focus to the digital ecosystem also facilitates a more realistic assessment of the necessity and proportionality of regulatory interventions. It enhances awareness of the economic and social costs of ecosystem-wide restrictions, particularly regarding freedom of expression, open competition in ICT products and services, and the ability to explore and innovate new applications of computing. Further, when it is clear that that the object of governance is the entire digital ecosystem and not some new, isolated thing called “AI,” we are in a much better position to assess what measures would be effective and how much governance is feasible in a world where heterogeneous technologies and distributed decision making are rampant, states compete for power, and no single state has supreme authority over the entire ecosystem.

The paper proceeds along the following lines. Part 1 provides a basic definition and description of the digital ecosystem and its components and explains why that conceptualization works better than various alternatives. Part 2 traces the scientific origins of the digital ecosystem and shows that cybernetic control and automation via artificial intelligence or machine learning were known to be latent in computing technology from the 1940s. Part 3 tracks the evolution of intelligent applications to show empirically how “AI” progress was tied to progressive improvement in the capabilities of all four components of the digital ecosystem, and that every one of the problems attributed to “AI” arose during the evolution of the Internet and other forms of computing. Hence, no clear line can be drawn between the governance of AI applications and the governance of the broader digital ecosystem. Part 4 evaluates some of the current proposals to “govern AI,” demonstrating they generally attempt to have the tail of AI applications wag the dog of the entire digital political economy, often resulting in ideas that either lack feasibility and/or entail extraordinary centralizations of power that could backfire on their proponents.

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The focus of this paper is on an economics-based analysis and redesign of mitigation of volumetric Denial-of-Service (DDos) attacks utilizing the initial packets in connection-oriented protocols. These attacks have been documented for decades and their volume and impact have been growing enormously. The contributions of the paper are: (1) a novel evaluation framework based on all of efficacy, threat, overhead, and damage as experienced by applications; (2) a comparison of TCP with SYN Cookies and QUIC with Retries, the two accepted DDoS mitigation approaches in these two transport protocols; (3) evaluation of our alternative proposal to use SYN Proof-of-Work (SYN PoW) to address these volumetric attacks more effectively; and (4) an in-depth discussion of the economics of the various stakeholders in these scenarios. As demonstrated in this work, the SYN PoW type of approach not only moves much of the cost of mitigation onto the attackers, unlike current proposals, but also enables verification of validity of traffic to be handled anywhere in the network, rather than only at the end-points, giving network service providers an additional capability for reducing malicious traffic. A critical contribution is that this type of approach

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This paper investigates a representative sample of smart city plans for the availability of data management policies. Review of smart city planning documents shows that few, if any, cities have well-articulated smart city plans. Using insights from agency theory as applied to contracting, we argue that data plans are designed to provide freedom to parties to utilize data in ways that may not adequately protect data sovereignty and digital rights. Current practices in smart cities for privacy, copyright, and Personally Identifiable Information (PII) that are often guided by commercial interests and private ownership are inherently in conflict with citizens’ data access and privacy concerns.

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It is no longer clear who should pay whom and how much for interconnection between Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and content providers. Large ISPs claim that large content providers are imposing a cost on ISPs by sending large amounts of traffic to their customers. ISPs claim that it is more fair that content providers pay for this cost than consumers, because then this cost will be paid only by those consumers with high usage. In contrast, large content providers (including content delivery networks (CDNs)) claim that when they interconnect with ISPs at interconnection points (IXPs) close to consumers, they are already covering the costs of carrying traffic through the core network, and that consumers are already covering the costs of carrying traffic through the ISP's access network. These disputes between large ISPs and large content providers have recurred often during the last 10 years. When not resolved, large ISPs have often refused to increase capacity at interconnection points with large content providers and transit providers, resulting in sustained congestion which has degraded users' quality of experience.

In this paper, we examine internet interconnection policies to analyze the effects of paid peering arrangements between ISPs and content providers/transit providers using the two-sided market model. Our key findings indicate that paid peering is unlikely to result in lower consumer broadband prices. Our results also show that if a content provider or transit provider provides sufficient localization of exchanged traffic, an ISP incurs the same cost as it does when it agrees to settlement-free peering with another ISP. Our research also shows that the public interest is best served by peering prices that are lower than those likely charged by large ISPs.

Our analysis shows that settlement-free peering is warranted if a content provider or transit provider provides sufficient localization of exchanged traffic. Traffic is sufficiently localized if: (1) they interconnect at a reasonable number of interconnection points, (2) the locations of these interconnection points span the country, and (3) the proportion of traffic that is exchanged at an interconnection point that is relatively close to the end user is sufficiently high. In particular, our analysis shows that in the case of peering between an ISP and a content provider, settlement-free peering is warranted when they interconnect at a minimum of 6 interconnection points and localize at least 50% of the traffic.

Therefore, we argue that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) should require ISPs to offer settlement-free peering arrangements to content and transit providers that agree to reasonably localize their exchanged traffic in this manner. We propose this policy recommendation as a means to serve the public interest by facilitating lower effective prices for internet data transport than market-negotiated paid peering fees. We also propose that the Commission should continue to monitor Internet traffic exchange arrangements under sections 201 and 202. In addition, however, it is now time for the Commission to determine that certain types of Internet traffic exchange arrangements are unreasonable or unreasonably discriminatory practices and would violate sections 201 or 202.

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An open-access market design is presented to manage network congestion and optimize network use and value. Open access eliminates the walled-garden approach; instead, it commoditizes communications network capacity while decentralizing access to a transparent wholesale market. It ensures that scarce capacity is put to its best use by providing a platform for efficient trade. The market operates without friction using flow trading. It allows participants to bid persistent piecewise-linear downward-sloping demand curves for portfolios of products, gradually adjusting positions toward targeted needs. Flow trading allows fine granularity of products in time and location, creating complete markets. Liquidity and computational feasibility are maintained despite trading millions of interrelated forward and real-time products. Participants manage risk and adverse price impact through trade-to-target strategies. The market operator clears the market every hour, finding unique prices and quantities that maximize as-bid social welfare. Prices, aggregate quantities, and the slope of the aggregate net demand are public. The market operator observes positions, enabling it to optimize collateral requirements to minimize default risk. Priority pricing is used to manage real-time imbalances. An application of the model is developed for intersatellite wholesale communications with optical (laser-beamed) mesh networks in space, showing several efficiency gains.

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The increasing integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into society raises critical questions about its impact on democracy. The development of AI governance frameworks presents a convenient and crucial ground to strengthen democracy, particularly through the lens of participatory and deliberative theories. From this viewpoint, this article seeks to explore the extent to which emerging AI governance frameworks uphold participatory and deliberative democracy. Through a comparative analysis of proposed or existing legislation in the European Union (EU), Brazil and Canada, this study investigates the specific tools and mechanisms each framework uses to involve the citizens in AI governance. The analysis reveals that while all three jurisdictions emphasise ethical governance and assessment of AI along with regulatory dialogue and multi-stakeholder collaboration, this does not effectively extend to creation of robust and specific mechanisms to facilitate citizens’ participation and deliberation. Exhibiting a stronger commitment to participatory and deliberative democracy, the Brazilian framework demonstrates a firmer position, incorporating a wider range of individual rights and direct avenues for citizen input and engagement, e.g. mandatory public consultation in advance of algorithmic impact assessment. Conversely, the Canadian and EU approaches largely rely on existing institutions and processes, overlooking the unique challenges, i.e. knowledge barriers, economic and social injustices, expert rule, that cannot be fully resolved by toolset of ethics governance or through alternative venues such as citizens’ assemblies. Overall, this study concludes by advocating for the integration of novel mechanisms that can facilitate citizen participation and deliberation within AI governance frameworks, including specifically designed and institutionalised deliberative venues.

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Regulatory agencies have expressed concerns that usage-based pricing (UBP) of internet service steers consumers from streaming video to traditional TV subscriptions. We study this issue with household-level panel data from an internet service provider’s UBP experiment, capturing the pricing strategy’s effects on internet and TV subscriptions, application-specific internet usage, and payments to the firm. UBP served largely to meter internet usage by high-demand households rather than steering them toward TV. Households’ payments increased due to usage-related overage charges and internet subscription upgrades to avoid overages. Households that avoided internet-related payments reduced their internet usage rather than adding TV subscriptions.

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Scholarly inquiry has yet to comprehensively explore the impact of Internet connectivity levels on dynamics related to online echo chambers, trust in online social networks (OSNs), and concern by users for algorithmic manipulation. To investigate the relationship between OSN users’ attitudes regarding online echo chambers, trust in OSN platforms, and concerns about algorithmic manipulation and Internet connectivity, we conducted a survey of more than 700 OSN users across diverse contexts. We collected responses from the United States, United Kingdom, India, and South Africa about attitudes and beliefs toward encountering discordant information in online settings. We integrate our survey response data with existing datasets from the Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA) which indexes infrastructure, affordability, consumer readiness, and content & services to analyze mobile connectivity in a country. Our study reveals marked differences in users’ reported concerns for prevalence of OSN echo chambers, trust in OSNs as a source for news information, and concern for algorithmic manipulation depending on the level of Internet connectivity in various geographic regions. Our findings will aid global policymakers in tailoring policies addressing the aforementioned and related Internet phenomena to suit the specific context of Internet accessibility within the targeted country.

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This study investigates the policies accompanying initiatives among many cities to become “smart.” Smart Cities technologies historically began with monitoring systems designed to improve the efficiencies of the physical and social systems required in contemporary urban environments, using communication networks as an increasingly capable backbone for gathering and transmitting all sorts of information (Mitchell, 1995). In the 21st century, several technical capabilities converged to create unique challenges regarding the intersection of smart city systems, privacy and civil liberties. Here we first examine how cities are crafting ordinances around surveillance technologies which dovetail with smart city technologies, paying particular attention to those that implicate AI. How they frame the need for regulation invokes several concerns that range from the administrative to data governance to human rights.

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Defining property rights in the electromagnetic spectrum is challenging because the natural laws governing the behavior of electromagnetic radiations are very different from those describing material resources like land, water, or air. Additionally, the rules for the composition and decomposition of spectrum licenses, thus created for trading in secondary markets, are difficult to derive and are generally not well understood.

In this paper, we employ the framework of dynamical systems theory to introduce a new theoretical model that captures the behavior of a radio service as a dynamical system that operates within a context of concurrently operating radio services. We then introduce the formal framework of assume-guarantee contracts for specifying spectrum operating rights allocated to each radio service. Our proposed model helps unify existing frameworks that rely on an environment-based specification of transmission permissions and reception protections. Our framework is in accordance with the FCC's 2023 Policy Statement that establishes spectrum management principles for transmitters and receivers.

Our work opens up an inter-disciplinary research program between the fields of spectrum management, robotics, control-theory and programming language theory. We illustrate the applicability of our framework with a simple two-system example focusing on FCC's recent 5G-vs-radio altimeter problem.

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In its Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights, the White House lists “notice and explanation” as one of five principles fundamental to protecting the American public as artificial intelligence (AI) is deployed. The Blueprint states “[y]ou should know that an automated system is being used and understand how and why it contributes to outcomes that impact you.” In its description of the notice/explanation principle, The White House emphasizes the importance of plain language explanations about AI use. Furthermore, a company should describe how it plans to use AI systems, how the systems work, and explain any risks to consumers. While AI transparency is associated with the possibility of auditable and accountable algorithmic systems, more research is needed to develop best practices. This project assesses the extent to which notices from 40 companies align with The White House call for AI transparency.

This study adapts a data privacy transparency assessment model to assess the AI transparency of 40 companies. The sample: 10 social media, 10 eCommerce, and 10 brick-and-mortar companies, and 10 banks. AI transparency was assessed via qualitative content analysis of AI transparency materials (via privacy policies) from company websites. Building on previous studies addressing data privacy transparency, the assessment involved assigning full, half, or zero stars on ten AI transparency criteria, including: whether transparency materials are accessible via company websites, and presented in plain language - assessed by Flesch-Kincaid grade reading level analysis, whether references to applicable laws/regulations are provided, whether information about how AI systems work and connections between AI systems and company decision-making are explained, whether the risks of AI use are explained, whether companies disclose details about data retention policies, and data storage/processing, and whether company AI transparency materials are posted elsewhere online.

Findings suggest companies provide privacy-related components of AI transparency but have yet to start disclosing details about the use and implications of algorithmic, automated systems. The average score across the 40 companies is 2.95/10 stars, with the average across social media companies (3.35/10), which is higher than e-commerce (2.75/10) and brick-and-mortar companies (2.75/10), as well as the banks (2.95/10). YouTube/Google had the highest score across the sample with 4.5/10 stars, and Alibaba and Disney+ had the fewest stars with 1.5/10. Each company sampled provided access to privacy materials via its homepage. All companies also provided information about applicable laws/regulations. Most companies provided details about data storage/processing and about half describe data retention policy. Few provided details about how AI systems work, how AI systems link to company practices, or risks of AI use. Most companies provided some form of information about AI or machine learning on a site away from the privacy policy. To ensure the auditability and accountability of AI systems, companies are encouraged to improve upon these transparency efforts by better-aligning with the calls for AI transparency in The White House Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights. Accessible and plain language notices are recommended, as is the inclusion of information about how AI systems work at each company, and the associated implications and risks of automated decision-making that may result from digital service use.

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The availability of reliable, high-speed internet throughout the United States has been a focus of policymakers for decades, with the need for an expansive broadband infrastructure listed as “the great infrastructure challenge” of the 21st century by the Federal Communication Commission. Federal policy has been implemented to confront this challenge, with investments targeting unserved and underserved regions of the country totaled $50 billion from 2009 – 2017, with $44 billion also spent from 2015 - 2020. Additionally, internet service providers (ISPs) have invested hundreds of billions more in broadband infrastructure, with estimates as high as $102 billion in 2022 alone.

Despite this investment, millions of Americans still need a broadband connection at home. A big reason for this lack of connection is the cost of services. Recent attempts to assist low-income households have included the Emergency Broadband Benefit (EBB) and the Affordable Connectivity Program (ACP). Additionally, Congress allocated nearly $65 billion for broadband programs through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) of 2021, with the majority of funding directed to the Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment Program (BEAD). A key component outlined in the program’s notice of funding opportunity is that state broadband officials, tasked with implementing the program and distributing billions of federal dollars in new investments, must ensure that “high-quality broadband services are available to all middle-class families … at reasonable prices” for BEAD-funded projects.

However, federal guidelines have never set a benchmark for what “reasonable prices” might mean for residents in each state, and there are no established benchmarks for determining what an affordable level of broadband service would look like throughout the country. Complicating the matter is the federal government’s goal of universal broadband access by 2030, pledging to connect “every resident and small business to reliable, affordable high-speed internet” (The White House, 2023). However, as with previous telecommunications policies, the lack of a precise definition for what “affordable” means hinders achieving the goal of universal, affordable access (Crandall and Waverman, 2000). To advance assessments about affordability, this paper opens the discussion on what publicly available data would be needed related to broadband pricing that could fit within a continuum approach to broadband.

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The Internet has become a critical basic infrastructure for society and the economy. As such, the resilience of the Internet is essential for the functioning and resilience of many sectors of our digital economies. In our increasingly digital society and economy, Internet is a key element of cyber-resilience. Understanding how to assess and promote Internet resilience are important policy challenges. In this paper, we discuss key aspects of the Internet design that differentiate it from other critical infrastructure and that are essential in considering its resiliency. We also explore how to achieve resiliency and provide a series of illustrative examples that reveal the challenges of achieving and measuring Internet resiliency, as well as mechanisms that contribute to it. Finally, we offer our thoughts on the policy challenges and approaches for promoting Internet resiliency.

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This article describes findings from user testing of Long Beach’s Digital Rights Platform. The Platform uses physical signage and an online portal to provide residents with a clear understanding of how local government applies predictive and diagnostic analytics to personal data. Grounded in theoretical frameworks of trust, surveillance studies, contextual integrity, and information economics, the Digital Rights Platform advances two critical and closely intersecting priorities for the City of Long Beach: implementation of its Data Privacy Guidelines and its vision to use residents’ data in non-discriminatory ways. We conducted user testing of the initial deployment of the Digital Rights Platform with 77 residents who each participated in data walks and two focus group discussions—one prior to and one following each walk—between March 2, 2024 and March 9, 2024. The analysis focuses on residents’ attitudes toward smart city technologies, how they situate data collection by these platforms and devices, and how deployment of a Digital Rights Platform influences—or doesn’t influence—levels of trust toward surveillance technologies deployed by the City of Long Beach. 

The findings from our March 2024 user testing events suggest that residents highly value access to information about the City's data privacy practices, but that it is unrealistic to expect residents to routinely read data privacy labels and scan QR codes when interacting with civic technologies in the public realm. Our analysis also finds that residents do not distinguish between data collection by City-deployed technologies/platforms and those deployed by corporations and social media sites (despite that local government does not commodify residents' personal information). In fact, residents said they perceive City data collection as part of a larger surveillant culture. Another key finding is that study volunteer are aware that they routinely trade privacy for convenience and "public safety" benefits. Finally, study participants expressed concern that non-English speakers and older residents are excluded from the benefits of the Digital Rights Platform.

Our findings will inform the next phase of our research. Specifically, we plan to collaborate with privacy engineers to develop a mobile privacy assistant that makes it simple for residents to set privacy preferences, and to request that third-party actors delete currently held data about them (a right granted under the California Consumer Privacy Act).

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Spectrum sharing, including dynamic spectrum sharing, is arguably the most significant overarching feature of the new era of spectrum management. The emphasis on sharing spectrum recognizes the importance of balancing the needs of different users of an exceptionally valuable resource. Despite the equitable features of spectrum sharing, what has been underemphasized in spectrum management is its colonial features from the perspective of Native Nations. This paper proposes ways to decolonize dynamic spectrum sharing and, in the process, improve prospects for a new spectrum era that recognizes Native Nations as collaborators in the American system of spectrum management.

Johannes M. Bauer is the Quello Chair in Media and Information Policy at Michigan State University. Since September 2023, he has been on leave from his faculty position to serve as the Chief Economist in the Office of Economics and Analytics at the Federal Communications Commission. His research examines the design of policies, regulation, and other governance mechanisms that are needed to secure the full benefits of advanced information and communication technologies for society while mitigating their potential risks.
Within that broad research program, he has a particular interest in policies affecting the availability and quality of broadband infrastructure, the governance of digital platform ecosystems, as well as policies that support digital innovation (5G/6G, Internet of Things, AI) and entrepreneurship in advanced technologies.
His research also addresses the distributional aspects of regulation and policy mechanisms that can be deployed to advance digital equity and inclusion to ensure that technologies benefit all members of society. Dr. Bauer has worked with practitioners in the private, public, and not-for-profit sectors in the United States, helping to find workable approaches to complex policy challenges.